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ABSTRACT
A model of a small open economy with a well-developed supply-side
and demand-side is presented. There are many 6cros engaged in
monopolistic competition, who take the wage and aggregate demand
as given, when deciding on their labour demand and investment
decisions. Aggregate supply depends on capital, the producers' real
wage and aggregate demand; investment depends on what firms expect
the real wage, aggregate demand, real interest rates and investment
subsidies to be in current and future periods. Aggregate demand
depends on disposable income, wealth, public spending, foreign
income, the real exchange rate and the world real-interest rate. There
is one monopoly union, who chooses the consumers real wage to
maximise a utilitarian utility function subject to the constraints describ-
ing the rest of the economy. Its behaviour is time inconsistent, since
it has an incentive to announce a low wage and then, once capital
has been accumulated, renege and cream off the quasi-rent of a
more-or-less fixed factor by demanding a higher wage. The time-
consistent behaviour is credible but is inefficient due to much lower
levels of capital, employment and activity. The results of this analysis
are used to describe the Dutch rise in unemployment. This analysis
pays particular attention to the level of real benefits, to the wedge
between producer and consumer wages, consisting of employers' and
employees' social security contributions, direct and indirect taxes and
the real exchange rate, to world trade, to investment subsidies and to
` An earlier version of this chapter was presented at a conference on 'Unamployment
in Europe' at Limburg University, Maastricht, 1~-19 April 1986. We are grateful for
the comments of the participants and in particular thanr Piet Keizer for his discussion
of the paper.
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demand management. Sociological changes, to explain a move from
`rules' to `discretion', may also be important.
1 INTRODUCTION
As in most European countries, unemployment in Holland has
increased considerably in the past ten to fifteen years. This
phenomenon is of major concern and warrants explanation. This
chapter sets out to explain employment and unemployment in a small
open economy with powerful trade unions. It provides a framework
in which various essential features of a small open economy, like that
of Holland, are imbedded. Wor(d trade is a dominating factor on the
demand side, whereas unions and long-run labour-supply are dominat-
ing factors on the supply side. The various instruments which the
government has available (tax rates, levels of benefits, investment
subsidies, public-sector expenditure and employment) affect both sides
of the economy. The investment behaviour of firms is an important
link between present and future.
The formal framework developed in this chapter consists of a model
with a well-developed supply side and a demand side. The supply
side is built around firms engaged in monopolistic competition. This
provides a role for demand. The firms take the wage rates and aggregate
demand as given when deciding on their labour demand and invest-
ment decisions. Aggregate supply depends on capital, the producer's
real wage and aggregate demand; investment depends on what firms
expect the real wage, aggregate demand and investment subsidies to
be in current and future periods. Aggregate demand in turn depends,
in a conventional way, on disposable income, wealth, public spending,
foreign income, the real exchange rate and world interest rates. In
combination with a money-demand equation and the various budget
definitions this system can be solved for the real exchange rate, the
producers' real wage, output and labour demand in terms of the
exogenous variables (the various tax and social security contribution
rates, investment subsidies, benefit levels, public-sector expenditure
and employment, the real world-interest-rate, foreign income and
labour supply) and in terms of the endogenous variables described
by the state equations (the capital stock, wealth, and the marginal
value of capital). The monopo(y union, the Stackelberg leader in the
underlying game chooses the consumers' real wage to maximise an
202 A Dutch Perspective
expected utility function subject to the constraints describing the rest
of the economy. In other words the interaction of the demand and
supply side of the economy leads to a complicated intertemporal
labour-demand schedule. This labour-demand schedule depends on
the level of the consumers' real wage rate which the firms expect the
union to set. From the point of view of the union this labour-demand
schedule is the trade-off which it faces between employment and
wages. The union will set current and future wage rates to maximise
the expected utility of her reference group; subject to the labour-
demand schedule. The more emphasis the union puts on employment,
the lower will be the wage-rate it chooses and vice versa: the smaller
the emphasis on employment the higher the wage rates.
In the absence of binding contracts the union's behaviour is time
inconsistent (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) since it has an incentive to
announce a low wage and then, once capital has been accumulated
renege and cream off the quasi-rent of a more or less fixed factor by
demanding a higher wage. The time consistent outcome is credible,
but is inefficient due to much lower levels of capital, employment and
activity. This is the paradox of the disadvantageous power of the
monopoly union.
The results of this paper are used to analyse the major empirical
tendencies of the past decades in Holland, in a coherent way; the rise
in unemployment and the large drop in investment, the increase in
the wedge between real producers' and real consumers' wages (consist-
ing of the employers' and employees' social security. contributions,
the wage tax, indirect taxes and the real exchange rate), the large
changes in world trade growth and real world interest rates, the
continuous rise in public sector employment and real benefits.
Attention is paid as well to sociological changes which might
explain a move from the time inconsistent to the time consistent
outcome.
The analysis put forward in this paper assumes a rational trade
union, which uses its power to achieve its goals. Unemployment is
henceforward the consequence of a rational choice by the union, a
choice between wages and (un)employment. What does this approach
imply for the causes of unemployment? First, it should be remarked
that this assumption does not imply that the union ought to be blamed
for the rise in unemployment experienced, for example, in Holland.
If the union represents employees well, then employees should in
general be satisfied with the choice and accept the consequences, of
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which unemployment is (the unpleasant) one. Next it does not imply
that the unions caused the increase in unemployment. There are the
other factors which influence the trade-off between (un)employment
and wages and thereby the choice the unions make. These trade-off-
influencing factors included the technology describing the production
side of the economy, external influences such as real world-interest-
rates and foreign income and government behaviour. By changing
benefit levels, tax rates, investment subsidies, public-sector-employ-
ment and public expenditure, the government changes the labour-
demand schedule. By changing the level of benefits and public-sector
employment the government can change elements in the union's utility
function in a direct way as well. For example reduced benefits will
increase the emphasis which unions put on employment and induce
them to reduce their wage claims which indeed will improve the
employment situation. Another factor influencing unemployment is
the solution concept of the model. For example a breakdown in the
social contract between employers and trade union, to stick to the
time-inconsistent solution and the other institutional features imbed-
ded in the model (i.e. the unions have no direct say in the employment
or investment decisions by the firms) may cause extra unemployment
if the firms change their assessment of the credibility of unions and
thereby make the time-consistent solution more appropriate.
In explaining the rise in unemployment in the Netherlands we will
in particular stress the role the government played by enlarging the
wedge between producers' and consumers' wage rates and by increas-
ing the level of real benefits, and the breakdown in the social contract
between employers and the trade union(s) at a time when the govern-
ment had lost most of her direct institutional impact on the wage-
setting process.
The chapter is organised as follows. The model is presented in
sections 2-6. Section 2 deals with the behaviour of the monopolistically
competitive firms notably their investment behaviour and demand for
labour. In section 3 the macroeconomic aspects of aggregate demand
are explained and the results of the interaction with the behaviour of
firms is investigated. In section 4, unions enter the analysis, and the
time-inconsistency of their behaviour is briefly discussed. Section 5
deals with credible wage formation. Confusion between real and
nominal magnitudes is briefly discussed in section 6. The formal
analysis of sections 2-6 is used in section 7 to explain the major
empirical trends in the Netherlands. Section 8 concludes the chapter.
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2 MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR
Consider N firms involved in monopolistic competition. To a certain
extent each firm can carve out a part of the market as products are
not homogeneous. The siandard analysis (McDonald and Solow, 1981)
is extended, since each firm also faces an investment problem with
internal adjustment costs (Gould, 1968). The demand curve for the
products of firm n is given by:
yn - D(Y, Pn~P) - (Y~N)(Pn~P)-Ecri~ Ey , 0 (8.1)
where y denotes aggregate demand in the economy, P„ denotes the
price charged by firm n and P denotes the average price level. The
technology of firm n is described by a concave production function,
y„ - f(k„, !„ ) where k„ denotes the capital stock offirm n and 1„ denotes
employment in firm n, with constant returns to scale and the usual
neoclassical properties. Adjustment of ihe capital stock is costly. The
larger the adjustment the higher the costs incurred. This can be
formalised by including a convex internal adjustment cost function
~( i„ ) in the profit function of firm n, where ~(0) - 0, ~" J 0 and i„
denotes gross investment of firm n. Firms have some monopoly power
in the product market but not in the labour market and face a
given wage. Each firm maximises the discounted value of its profit
stream:
Max J e-.',rr„ dt, ~r„-PnYn- ~n-g~~n}~(~n )j (8.2)
~~.l,~.i.~ p
subject to the capital accumulation equation:
k„ - i„ - Sk„, k„(0) - k~ (8.3)
where r, S, ~r„, W and q denote the rate of interest, the depreciation
rate, profits of 6rm n, the nominal wage paid by the firm and the price
of investment goods, respectively. If the Hamiltonian of firm n is
defined as
~
Hn - Pn.i~( kn , !„ ) - ~n - 9 ~ in f ~ ( in ) j
-Xn(f(kn,ln)-D(Y,Pn~P)j}~1~(i„-Skn) (8.4)
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where X„ is a Lagrange multiplier and ~;, is the nominal shadow price
of capital for firm n, then the optimality conditions are aH„~dP„-
aH„~al„-dH„~dl„-Oand rA;,-~~-àH„~dk,,. They yield in sym-
metric equilibrium
P„-P, l-Nl,,, k-Nk~, ~;,-,1', X„-P~E;
I(~, l)- wP~[1-E-'(Y)l (s.s)
where WP- W~P is the producers' real wage, ~'(i„)-(~;,-q)~q or
i-1 L ~ 1(1~~) J , I(0)-0, 1'-N~~" (8.6)
where q - P(1 - rr), ~ is the investment subsidy rate and a - A'~ P is
the real shadow price of capital, and
.1~k(k, l)[1-e-`(Y)~-(rfS-Í'~P-.1~A),1 (8.7)
Equation (8.5) says that the marginal revenue product of labour equals
the real wage, so that the demand for labour can be written as
1-kh(WP,y), hWP~O, hy~0 (8.8)
The advantage of a framework based on monopolistic competition is
that the demand for labour not only decreases with the real producers'
wage (h~,,P c 0) but also increases with the aggregate demand for goods
(h,, ~ 0), since it is assumed that the elasticity of demand for each firm
is an increasing function of aggregate demand (e'(y)~0). Nickell
(1985) shows that the framework encompasses two interesting alterna-
tives. Normal cost pricing assumes that the price mark-up;
P~ W-[1 - e-'(Y)J-'~f ( l,f(Y~ k)) (8.9)
where y~k-f(1, l~k) yields l~k-f(y~k), is independent of demand,
so that s'(y) ~ 0 and therefore h,, ) 0 must hold. Perfect competition
leads to price equals marginal cost, so that e(y)-~ and therefore
h,, - 0. Equation ( 8.6) says that, when the marginal value of capital
exceeds the real cost of investment goods, investment takes place.
Equation (8.7) says that the marginal revenue product of capital has
to match thé user cost of capital, where the latter consists of the rental
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charge plus the depreciation charge minus the capital gains term. Note
that the firm will not, due to the presence of internal adjustment costs,
adjust its capital stock instantaneously. The fact that adjustment costs
increase with the absolute size of the rate of investment or disinvest-
ment limits the size of the firm.
The behaviour of the firm can be described by the labour-demand
curve, (8.8), the capital accumulation equation:
II ~ 1(1~~) J -Sk, k(0)-ko,
and the shadow price equation:
(8.10)
A-(r~`fS)A-g(WP y), lim e-'~`.1(t)k(t)-0 (8.11),v~
where r~` - r- P~ P is the real rate of interest given by the world real
rate of interest and g( WP, y) -fk(l, h( WP, y))(1- e-'(y)), g~,,P ~ 0,
g,, - 0 gives the marginal revenue product of capital.
The steady-state investment rate is just sufficient to provide for
depreciation, i(co) - Sk(oo), and this raises the shadow price of capital
above the price of investment goods, A(co) - 1- Q-F- ~'(Sk(oo)). Upon
substitution in (8.11), one obtains the steady-state levels of the capital
stock:
k(~) - K~( WP, Y, r~`, ~),
and of output
Y(~) - K~( W P, Y, r~`, ~).i~(1, h( W P, Y)) - i'~( WP, Y. r~`~ ~)
(8.12)
(8.13)
Hence, an increase in ihe real wage which firms have to pay or the
real interest rate and a reduction in investment subsidies or aggregate
demand leads to higher levels of capital, employment and output.
Capital formation clearly accentuates the adverse consequences of
higher real wage rates on employment. The determinant of (8.10)-
(8.11) is -S(r~`tS)~0, so the steady-state is a saddlepoint. Hence,
capital is a backward-looking variable and investment (or a) is a
forward-looking variable. It follows that investment today depends
on expectations of the producers' real wage, investment subsidies and
aggregate demand tomorrow.
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3 THE DEMAND-SIDE OF A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
Section 2 described the supply side of the economy. This section
describes the demand side. The economy is a small open economy
with highly integrated capital markets and perfect substitution between
home and foreign bonds, so that the home real interest rate is pegged
to the world real interest rate (as it is assumed that the expected
depreciation of the real exchange rate is zero). The rest ofthe economy




f x~Y~`, pPe) - m(Y, pl,e)
~t
-Y~Af aps tli t2f t3f t4i ~i Ó~ I8, ~`, n, r~, y~, Pe, Wp~ (0.14)
M~P`` - I(YP~P`, r, áp) (8.15)
P` - P~(P~`e)'-s(1 f t3) (8.16)
~






af-- y-[if ~(i)]-c-g~f r~`aj (8.19)
p
w` P` - W'P(1 - t, )(1- rZ), r- W~ (8.20)
c real consumption'
yd real disposable incomeZ
ap real private sector asset holdings (ap - a8 f af)
ag real public sector debt
af real Dutch asset holdings
g real public sector expenditure (using p as deflator)
x real exports
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y~ world real income
p~` foreign price level
e nominal exchange rate
p~e
P real exchange rate
m real imports'
M nominal stock of high powered money
P` consumers price index (geometrically weighted)
b` ~ the real level of unemployment benefits ( p` is the deflator)
n supply of labour
1g public sector employment
t, rate of employers and employees social security contributions
tZ wage tax rate
t, rate of indirect taxation
t, profit tax
W` real consumers wage ( W` - W~P`)
t wedge between real producers' and consumers' wages
Equation (3.1) is the IS-curve, which shows that aggregate demand
increases when, disposable income, real wealth, public spending (on
goods), investment subsidies, the marginal value of capital, labour
supply, public-sector employment or world income increases and when
the real exchange rate depreciates. Equation (8.15) is the LM-curve,
which shows that the real demand for cash balances increases with
real income and wealth and decreases with the nominal interest rate.
In the absence of any confusion between real and nominal magnitudes
the monetary part of the model is separable from the real part, inflation
is entirely a monetary phenomenon and therefore follows from the
LM-curve. Equation (8.16) is based on Cobb-Douglas preferences
and shows that the consumers' price index is a geometrically weighted
average of the price of home and imported goods, plus a percentage
to allow for the rate of indirect taxation. Equation (8.17) defines real
disposable income, which consists of benefit income for the unem-
ployed, after tax income for the private and public sector employed,
after tax profit income and real income from asset holdings (private
sector labour demand and profits can be solved from (8.2) and (8.8)).
Equations (8.18) and (8.19) define respectively the private sector asset
holdings and the net Dutch asset holdings. The increase in private-
sector asset holdings corresponds to the increase in holdings of foreign
assets and public debt. They follow from the private- and public-sector
budget constraints.
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Finally equation (8.20) defines the 'wedge' between what a 6rm
pays a worker and what a worker receives in his pocket. The logarithm
of this wedge can be approximated by:
` (8.21)1nt-1n WP-t,ftzft~f(1-~3)log1 pe~,
so that the wedge increases when the real exchange rate depreciates
or when any of the three tax rates increases. Obviously a larger wedge
will lead to more unemployment (see section 4).
Intersection of the aggregate demand schedule (8.14) and the aggre-
gate supply schedule y- kj(1, h(tW`, y) - kF(tW`) ensures goods
market equilibrium and yields the equilibrium real exchange rate,





- Wp(~ ~f ap~ tl f t2r t3r t4e Qi gilgs u`~ ni r~i Y~e WC)
(8.23)
level of activities,
Y-Y(~, ~, áp, t~, tz, t3~ ta~ ~~ 8, Í8, ~i`, n, r~`, y~`, W`) (8.24)
and labour demand ( by (8.8)),
l- L(~ ~, áp, ti, ~z, t~, ~a, ~, 8, l8, b`, `n, ~~`, `y~`, W`) (8.25)
An increase in aggregate demand, caused by an increase in public
spending, world activity, wealth, investment subsidies, benefits, labour
supply, government employment or the marginal value of capital to
the firm or caused by a fall in the rate of social security contribution,
direct tax rate or the world real interest rate, and a reduction in
aggregate supply, caused by a fall in the capital stock or an increase
in any of the four tax rates or the real consumers' wage, leads to an
incipient excess demand for goods, which is choked ofi by a real
appreciation of the exchange rate. This leads to a fall in the wedge
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between the producers' and the consumers' real wage, over and above
any changes in the wedge that causes the initial incipient excess
demand for goods. Hence, the employment-generating effects of an
increase in capital or a reduction in the wedge are attenuated by the
associated depreciation ofthe real exchange rate. Also in a small open
economy, increases in aggregate demand, e.g. due to increases in
public spending or world income, increase employment and output,
since the associated appreciation reduces the 'wedge'.
4 TIME-INCONSISTENCY OF THE OPTIMAL WAGES OF
A MONOPOLY UNION
The small open economy has one dominant trade-union movement,
which looks after the interests of both employed and unemployed
workers. It has monopoly power on the labour market, so that it can
effectively set any consumers' real wage it wishes. In choosing its wage
the union takes account of the investment and employment decisions
of the `fringe' of monopolistically competitive firms and of the aggre-
gate demand side of the economy, so the trade union is completely
rational. It maximises a quasi-concave utility function:
Max J ~ e-'~` U( W`, !) dt
W~ o
(8.26)
subject to the reduced-form relationships (8.8), (8.10), (8.11), (8.18)
and (8.23). For example, the union may attempt to maximise the total
wage bill (e.g. Dunlop, 1944), total rent, that is surplus income over
the wage bill under perfect competition in the labour market (e.g. de
Menil, 1971) or a more general Stone-Geary utility function that
allows for subsistence levels ofwages and employment and the import-
ance of supernumerary wages and employment (e.g. Pencavel, 1984).
Alternatively, the private-sector trade-union maximises the expected
utility of a member of the reference group of the union (e.g. McDonald
and Solow, 1981; Oswald, 1985) of the form:
U(W`,l)-n ll u(W`)f(nnlllg)u(b`), u'70, u",0
s s
(8.27)
where n denotes labour supply, 1 private sector employment, lg govern-
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ment sector employment and 6` denotes the level of real unemploy-
ment benefits. l~(n -!8) is taken as the probability of a member of
the reference group of being employed and (n -1-1g)~(n -1g) as the
probability of being unemployed. It is assumed that the trade unions
reference-group includes all private-sector employees (1) and all unem-
ployed (n - I- Ig). The union effectively acts as a Stackelberg leader
and the rest of the economy as followers.
It will be assumed, for simplicity, that the elasticity of demand for
each firm is constant (e~-0) and that wealth effects in consumption
are, due to capital market imperfections, fairly small (c3 - 0). The







where }i and ~ are the union's shadow-price for capital and the firm's
shadow-price of capital. Hence, on the assumption of an interior
solution, the following are necessary conditions for optimality:
a2H"~aZ W` ~ 0, aH"~a W` - 0, or
u( W`) - u(b`)
u'( W`)
h(tW`) - ~rl(n - lg)S~(tW`)~ku~(tW`)~
'e'(t WC) W~Slks ~~ aps tl ~ t2f t3s t4~ ~~ g~ !g~ b`~ n~ r~~.y~i WC)
10, (8.29 )





,~ - r~~ -aH"~aA - -S~ -~.1'~ ,~(o) - 0.1-a'
(8.31)
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The marginal value to the union of the firms' shadow-price of capital
must be equal to zero at the beginning of the planning period, because
the firms' investment rate and shadow-price are free to jump at that
point of time and therefore become effectively an additional policy
instrument for the monopoly union.
Definition 4.1 The optimal wage strategy is time inconsistent
(Kydland and Prescott, 1977) if there is an incentive for the union
to reoptimise its wage strategy at some later date, that is if 3s, t
such that W`(t, s) ~ W`(t, 0), s ~ 0 and t, s, where W`(t, s) is the
optimal consumption wage at time t when the planning perioé7
(re)starts at time s. (]
Proposition 4.1 The optimal wage strategy is time-inconsistent.
Proof: There is no time inconsistency if ~(t)-0, Vt,O. Assume
therefore that this is the case and see whether this leads to a
contradiction. Equation (8.31) shows that 1.~.(t)-0, Vt-O upon which
equation (8.30) shows that eiiher W`(t)-b`, dt.0, orh fkh'Wp-
0, dt, 0. The former case implies, using equation (4.4), that I(t)-0,
`d t, 0. This is inconsistent with the Inada conditions as f, ~ oo and
not to b` as l~k-~0. The latter case imp{ies u(W`)-u(b`)-
-u'(W`)kWP~W 5~0 or W`(t)~b, dt~0, which can not hold
either as, workers would then preter to be on the dole rather than
be employed. Hence, rt(i)-0, bft 30 can not hotd aiong~
brium path and therefore the optimal wage strategy must betime-
inconsistent.
This time inconsistency is a familiar feature of open-loop Stackelbepg
equilibrium solutions to diflerential games. It implies that the optimal
wage strategies must be backed up by binding contracts, otherwise
the union will renege. There is an incentive for the union to renege,
because by announcing the intention of demanding low wages in the
future along the lines of the time-inconsistent solution, it can persuade
the firms to invest in a relatively large capital stock. Once the machines
are installed, the monopoly union has an incentive to cheat and to
claim higher wages than promised in order to extract the rent of a
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quasi-fixed factor. Obviously, such cheating can be prevented by
binding contracts. Grout (1984) and Bean (1983) find a similar time
inconsistency in a two-period model with cooperative wage-employ-
ment contracts.
Equation (8.29) can be solved for W` and for WP,
Wv - Wv(~,~ ~~ ap~ ~l ~ t2i r3~ t4s Q~ g~ lgr Vcr ni r~r.Y~) (8.32)
so that the wage firms have to pay increases when the level of unem-
ployment benefits and public-sector employment increases or labour
supply decreases, and furthermore when any of the four tax-rates
increases or when there is a real appreciation (caused by an increase
in ,~, Q, g, a, or y~` or by a reduction in k or r~`). An increase in benefits
reduces the gap between an employed and an unemployed person's
utility and therefore reduces the marginal cost to the union from
raising the wage. In other words, the union places at the margin, less
value on jobs than on income and consequently demands a higher
wage.
A reduction in labour supply or an increase in public-sector employ-
ment works in the same way as an increase in benefits. They reduce
the utility attached to the gap between an employed and unemployed
person's utility and therefore reduce the marginal beneóts for the
union from raising the wage. The supply effects of these variables
dominate the opposite demand effects.
The marginal value to the union of the firms' investment rate, n, is
typically negative, since the union and firms have conflicting objectives.
For example in steady state ~.i,(m) 7 0 so ~(oo) c 0 follows from (8.31).
Hence, -~ can be interpreted as a marginal cost to the union. An
increase in the marginal cost to the union of the firms' shadow-price
increases the marginal cost to the union from raising the wage, because
it worsens the adverse effects of a higher wage on the marginal
productivity of capital. The monopoly union consequently values jobs,
at the margin, more than income and lowers the optimal wage.
5 CREDIBLE WAGE FORMATION
The previous section showed that non-cooperative outcomes are time-
inconsistent, so that binding contracts are required. However, in many
countries such contracts are not available. In principle, it is possible
that reputational forces may, when the discount rate is small enough
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and the game between the monopoly union and the rest of the economy
is repeated indefinitely, ensure that the monopoly union does not
renege even though there is a short-run incentive to do so (e.g. Barro
and Gordon, 1983; Driffill, 1985; van der Ploeg, 1987; Horn and
Persson, 1985). It is one of the conjectures of this paper (see Section
7) that, due to increased eonflict between the trade union movement
and firms in the early 1970s the trust and reputational forccs have
broken down. In such circumstances the optimal (but time-incon-
sistent) wage strategies of Section 4 are no longer credible, because
the firms no longer believe that the union will not renege when it has
an incentive to do so. The main purpose of this section is to argue
that credible outcomes are Pareto-inferior to the optimal outcomcs
and are characterised by high wages and low levels of the capital
stock, employment and output.
It can be shown that the consistent outcome or the feedback Stackel-
berg equilibrium solution for this particular problem can be obtained
by replacing equation (8.31) by ~{t)-0, t.0 (see van der Ploeg,
1987), which avoids a rather cumbersome solution based on dynamic
programming. It follows that the optimal wage rate to be paid by firms
is given by:
Wp - WplOe ~`e w api tlf t2~ t3s t4s ~s Á r egi VCS n ~e r~~ y) 18.33)
so that, ceteris paribus, the wage is higher ihan in the pre-commitment
outcome of Section 4 where ~ 10. It follows that the marginal produc-
tivity of capital, the shadow-value of capital and the labour-capital
ratio are lower in the credible, consistent outcome than in the pre-
commitment outcomes. Hence, less capital is accumulated and unem-
ployment is high (because of both the higher producers' wage and
the lower capital stock) when there are no binding contracts or reputa-
tional forces have broken down. The reason is that, in the absence of
binding contracts, the monopoly union is unable to convince the firms
that it will stick to a strategy of low wages. Consequently, firms
accumulate less capital and jobs are lost. The introduction of long-term
wage contracts or reputational forces leads to a Pareto improvement,
since the lower cost of labour makes the firm better off and the union's
utility is improved as there are many more jobs created. This paradox
of the disadvantageous power of a monopoly union clearly demon-
strates the desirability of a political, sociological and legal framework
that ensures that announced wage strategies are enforced.
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Note from (8.33) that an increase in benefits or in the wedge, due
to an increase in any of the four taxes or due to real depreciation,
increases the producers' wage and therefore leads to less capital and
to more unemployment.
6 CONFUSION BETWEEN REAL
AND NOMINAL MAGNITUDES
So far, we have given a detailed account of the interactions between
a monopoly trade union and a fringe of monopolistically competitive
producers in a small open economy under various institutional
arrangements. It was found that unemployment increases when the
direct tax rate, indirect tax rate, employers' and employees' social
security contributions, the level of benefits or labour supply increases.
Aggregate demand management only had a supply-side effect on
unemployment through the wedge between the consumers' and pro-
ducers' real wage. That is, a contraction of aggregate demand through
an increase in the world real interest rate or a reduction in public
spending or world income, leads to a long-run depreciation of the
real exchange rate, lower prices for home produced goods, and there-
fore a larger wedge and more unemployment.
To give a more conventional role for aggregate demand, it is
necessary to introduce some confusion between real and nominal
magnitudes. For example, there may be asymmetric information so
that the firm knows the price level exactly and the union has to form
expectations of it (cf. Friedman, 1968). In that case (8.32) becomes:
~1 e L p
wp -r Wpl~,~ ~i ap~ t 1 i~2f ~3i t4i ~~ g~ !g~ V`~ n, r~f y~) (0.34)
P
and similarly for (5.1). With the assumption of adaptive expectations,
ár (pe) - ~[`P~ - `PeI J'
~~0 (8.35)
and the use of the LM-curve (8.15), to give the rate of inRation ( p~p),
the model is complete. Under perfect foresight ~-~~, the model
becomes as in Sections 2-5. For finite ~, it is possible for an expression
of aggregate demand to lead to a temporary increase in employment
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over and above the increase in employment due to the associated
contraction of the wedge.
7 SUPPLY, DEMAND AND INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES
IN THE NETHERLANDS
In the previous sections the analytical framework in which the
empirical trends will be discussed was set out. In this section we will
present some of these trends and discuss the way they fit together.
The most concerning and significant trend in the past fifteen years
in Holland, as in many countries, has been the rise in unemployment.
The Dutch unemployment rate has changed relatively much. It
remained below the EEC or OECD average until the early 1970s,
equalled the increased average of the unemployment rate of these sets
of countries in the mid-1970s and at the end of the 1970s it steeply
rose above the rising trend of the EEC and OECD countries (see
Figure 8.1). Even though the official unemployment figures have
increased so much, they still underestimate the actual trends in unem-
ployment because of the various measures arranged to reduce the
o~icial number of unemployed. In Holland these measures include
increased compulsory enrolment in educational institutions and
benefits for disabled workers which are granted partly on the basis of
the employment perspectives of the participants.
Underlying the trend in unemployment are the trends in employment
(1 f 1g) and labour supply (n) (Figure 8.2). The rise in employment
levelled off in the early 1970s whereas the labour force kept increasing.
We have included in the figure N broad, a series for labour supply
which includes the in-stream in the disabled benefits programme for
employed since its major modification in 1969 and N potential, a
series which is constructed by taking 70 per cent of the population in
the age range 20-64. 70 per cent is roughly the Dutch participation
ratio in the 1950s.
The number of employed is in fact a bad measure for real employ-
ment, total hours worked (see Figure 8.3), because hours worked per
year per person and sick-leave have changed rather significantly over
the years. Sick-leave and hours worked per year show a long-run
upward trend, whereas ihe first moves pro- and the second counter-
cyclically.
Another important trend is the one in investment (Figure 8.4).
Comparing Figure 8.4 with Figure 8.3 illustrates why we have put so
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much emphasis or explaining employment and investment in relation
to each other. The levelling off. of employment growth (I) coincides
with the drop in gross (i) and net investment as a percentage of the
production of firms (y). If (proper) data on the capital stock had been
available for the Netherlands, the labour-capital ratio (l~k, see
equation (8.8)) would have provided valuable insights.
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The change in output (y), labour costs ( W ~) and labour productivity
(y - Í- W') are the subjects of Figures 8.5 and 8.6 respectively.
A number of factors, to some extent specifically Dutch, may be
responsible for these trends in output, (un)employment, investment
and labour costs. In sections 2-6 we have set up a framework to
analyse these factors. Various external factors, foreign income y~`, real
foreign interest rates r~`, labour supply n, and government factors,
government demand for goods g, various tax and social security
contribution rates ( t,, t2i t,, t4), investment subsidies, public sector
employment and the real level of benefits were distinguished, besides
the private sector stock of wealth, a,, and capital stock, k It is rather
unfortunate that there are no proper data on the marginal value of
capital, a, or on Tobin's `Q', available. This co-state variable ~ is
closely correlated with investment and both are complex functions of
present, past and future versions of the exogenous variables. This
makes analysis without exact observations on ~ rather hard. The same
lack of data applies for investment subsidies (or negative taxes), ~.
Government demand for goods, g, and world trade or world activity,
y~`, exert their influence mainly through the demand side.' The short-
run effect, for given values of a, k, and ,1, of an increase in world
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Figure 8.5 Output growth in the Netherlands, 1955-84
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trade or government demand is an increase in the price or home-
produced goods and therefore an appreciation of the real exchange
rate ( p~`e~ P). An increase in the real foreign interest rate, r~`, for
we used the deflated German call money rate, has the opposite effect
on the real exchange rate. World-trade growth is depicted in Figure
8.7, real foreign interest rate in Figure 8.8, government expenditure
in Figure 8.9 and the real exchange rate in Figure 8.10. The appreciation
of the real exchange rate in the 1970s is fairly well explained by the
short-run effects of the changes in world trade, real foreign interest
rates and government demand. The appreciation of [he real exchange
rate reduced the wedge between producers' and consumers' real wage
rates and this by itselfmust have stimulated output and labour demand
and reduced unemployment.
The development of the `wedge' was however domínated by other
factors - the tax rates and rates of social security contribution. During
the past two decades, direct and indirect tax rates (t2i t3) and the
employers' and employees' rates of social security contribution (t,)
have increased at a breathtaking pace (Figure 8.11), and have enlarged
the wedge considerably (Figure 8.12). Though part of the increased
burden of taxes and social security contributions is borne by the
wage-earners, a rational union will not make the members of its
reference group bear the complete burden. It will reduce the consumer












i~ i i ~ i ~~ ~ i ~ i ~ ~~ ~ i ~ ~ i ~ ~~ ~ i














Figure 8.8 The real foreign interest rate, 1961-83
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Figure 5.12 The wedge in the Netherlands, 1955-84
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wage rates, but by a smaller percentage than the tax or social security
contribution rate increase. This behaviour results in increased pro-
ducer-wages, reduced levels of employment and increased unem-
ployment.
Another major impact on the economy has come from the benefit-
setting behaviour of the government. Benefits, b`, have grown at an
incredible pace up to 1979 (Figure 8.13). The effects on real wage
costs (producer-wage-rates) of raising real benefit levels are rather
large. In this way the government reduces the marginal costs'to the
union of raising the consumers' wage. The effects on wages were
especially large since around 1970. Benefits were linked to the con-
sumers' wage rates at that time, effectively reducing the marginal costs
to the union of raising the consumers' wage rate even further.
The gradual enlargement of the number of civil servants, !g and the
rapidly increasing number of beneficiaries of disabled `pensions' (see
Figure 8.2) will have had the same effect as increasing benefits had.
By removing unemployed from the labour force, in particular the
private-sector labour force, the government prevented the rapidly
increasing labour force, n, from exerting a moderating inHuence on
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the consumers' wage rate by increasing the marginal costs to the trade
union of raising the wage rate.
Another cause for the large drop in the employment growth rate
coinciding with the drop in investment can be sought in the institu-
tional relations between trade union(s) and firms. The post-war history
of Holland was one of close cooperation between trade union(s),
government and firms to rebuild the war-damaged Dutch economy.
The ensuing cooperation led to wages below the free market level and
the observation of `black wages', illegal bonuses paid on top of the
officially agreed wages (Windmuller, de Galan and van Zweeden,
1983). In the 1960s the wage-guide policy of the government was
relaxed, though the government retained some instruments to inftuence
the wage-setting process. The dispute about the new wage-guide act,
`de Loonwet 1968', indicates that even the reduced role of the govern-
ment in wage-setting was no longer generally accepted.
One might say that the social contract between trade unions and
firms broke down at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the
1970s. The year 1971 saw a wild strike in the harbour, warning the
trade-union leadership that a more aggressive attitude was wanted. In
the labour party's political programme `turnpoint '72', various pro-
posals were launched by which the trade unions would be given,
among other things, a say in the investment decision of firms.
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In the terminology ofour model we can describe these developments
as follows; the social contract between trade unions and firms deter-
mines the rules of the game: the trade union sets the wage, but the
firms take the investment decisions; the government guarantees a more
moderate and socially superior outcome of the wage-setting process,
say by making the time-inconsistent solution of the model feasible (of
course there are other ways to formalise this idea as well). T'he
breakdown of the social contract can be seen as a change to the
time-consistent solution ofthe model. Without a(government) guaran-
tee that the trade union(s) stick to their words (the announcements
of future consumer-wage-rates) and given the increased antagonism
and distrust between the trade union(s) on the one hand and employers
on the other hand, the socially inferior time-consistent solution will
be appropriate, implying decreased levels of investment and employ-
ment and an increased unemployment rate.
8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter we have modelled a small open economy with strong
trade unions. The supply side was well-developed, investment was
explicitly treated as well as trade union behaviour, and a demand side
was specified.
The results of our formal analysis were used to trace the consequen-
ces ofdemand side, supply side and institutional changes on the Dutch
economy. The most striking facts are the historical increase in the
wedge between the producers' and the consumers' real wage, the rise
in real benefit levels and possibly, a regime switch from `rules' to
`discretion'. They have all contributed significantly to the large drop
in investment and the large rise of unemployment in the Netherlands.
Appendix: Summary of Model
Supp(y-model
1- kh(tW`,'y); y- kJ(l, h(tW`, y)) ( A.1)
k- 11 A 1(1 aa)~ - Sk, k(0) - ko (A.2)
A-(r`~`fS)A-g(tW~,`y), lime-`''A(t)k(t)]-0 (A.3)~v~
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Demand-side
r'- r- P~P - exogenous (A.4)
Y- YI ~. ao, ti. tz. t3. ta.Q, 81g. b`, r'.Y', pe, Wo~ (A.5)








I Note that c-(cdP~-c~`p~`e)~P where cd is consumption of domes[ic
goods and c' is consumption of foreign goods.
2 After intiation adjustment of the asset holdings.
3 From(8.16)c~`p'e-(1-(3)(ceP~-c'p'e),som-c'-(1-li)c(p~`e~P).
4 World-trade differs from world activity in the sense that it signals
improved international division of labour as well as world activity. An
improved international division of labour shifts the production frontier.
Holland may well have benefited to a large extent from such tendencies
in the 1960s.
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